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Among recent books one is of great interest to friends of the Classics. I refer to a volume by Professor J. P. Mahaffy, entitled *What have the Greeks done for Modern Civilization* (Putnam's). The book consists of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute at Boston in December, 1908, and January, 1909, and repeated in whole or in part at various universities. The book will be reviewed later in our columns. At present I present some quotations from the preface; I should like to have these read in connection with certain remarks in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 2. 137.

And yet I believed that the high honour in which Greek studies were long held had been exchanged for indifference, or even contempt, especially in America, where a hurried education planned for "practical life" was said to be taking the place of the old liberal education intended to breed gentlemen. But I found, during my actual visit to America, that I had been misled as to the completeness of this degradation of Greek. As is usual, the stranger begins by getting false impressions of the country he visits, and can only correct these gradually by detailed experience. There were many symptoms that public opinion in the States is by no means satisfied with the thought of an absolute reign of modern science, or of specialising education at the fancy of the ignorant youth or the more ignorant parent. Even employers in factories are beginning to find out, with that plain good sense which marks the solid core of American society, that young men who receive a liberal education are more intelligent and useful as tradesmen or mechanics than those who have mastered only one subject. The intellectual outlook tells even upon the handicraft of the apprentice.

There is therefore some prospect that the mistakes of the last generation . . . will be corrected, and that a proper college education will again replace the bread-and-butter studies in the earlier years of all good courses of training. If such a recovery of sound education takes place, it is impossible that Greek shall not resume its old importance. We now know far more of Hellenic work than did our Forefathers. We can vindicate Greek studies in a manner wholly strange to them, had they ever thought a vindication called for. But, on the other hand, the teaching of Greek must be reformed. It must be made a human and lively study, taught like a modern language by dictation and recitation, as well as by written composition and reading of authors. In many English public schools, there has been a fashion not only of teaching the old languages as if they were indeed dead, but of spoiling the teaching of modern languages by copying this mistake. Much of the prejudice against the learning of Greek has been created by this blunder, and by its radiation into

kindred studies. But this also I trust will be mended, and we shall have a more intelligent method of teaching all languages as living vehicles of human expression. Among these, the Greek is far the most perfect.

Two observations are worth making here before I conclude: The American professors of Greek and Latin have exactly the same experience that we have in Ireland regarding the abandonment of Greek while professing to retain Latin. Neither there nor in Ireland have we failed to note the deterioration of Latin teaching, and the conviction grows upon us that a teacher who knows no Greek cannot be a Latin scholar in any real sense.

So much for the boasted retaining of Latin while sacrificing Greek.

The next observation concerns the now fashionable attending of courses in English Literature. In no case during my visit did I hear a literary conversation spring up among these students of English.

They have no doubt admirable professors in great numbers, specialists on every English poet and prose writer worth naming. But apparently poetry learnt without labour in the mother tongue is not assimilated or appreciated as is the poetry of Classical languages, and from them the delight in literature as such spreads into kindred studies. Wherever I cited the poets, or indeed great prose such as the Bible, among the young people who had studied English as a subject for graduation, I found a strange ignorance of what ought to have been most familiar. I was almost driven to believe the paradox that without a classical education even the proper appreciation of English literature is unusual.

Teachers of English might, perhaps, be inclined to resent the latter part of Professor Mahaffy's words as quoted above; if so, I would commend to their notice and careful consideration quotations from an address by Professor W. L. Cross, a teacher of English, to be found in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 2. 89. C. K.

TWO FACTORS IN LATIN WORD-ORDER

The second volume of *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* contains a very interesting discussion of the relation of emphasis to Latin word-order. Professor Greene (pp. 2-4, 10-13, 213-215) undertakes to show that the Latin sentence is regularly climactic, that the strongest emphasis is usually at the end. He recognizes, however, that emphasis is not the only factor in the problem. Professor Preble (pp. 130-134), on the other hand, maintains that, aside from enclitics and proclitics, the emphasis is strongest at the opening of the sentence and weakens steadily to the end.

The two theories are almost diametrically opposed to each other, and one might think it an easy task to decide between them. But, as a matter of fact, one cannot help feeling that, while in some cases Professor Greene's interpretation is correct, in other instances Professor Preble has the best of the argument. When Cicero says in his *Pro Milone* (34) *At eo repugnante fiebat, immo vero eo fiebat magis, magis* surely carries the strongest emphasis, and *fiebat*, at the end of the first clause, is only slightly weaker (see Mr. Greene, pp. 10, 214, Mr. Preble, p. 133). A sure instance of initial emphasis is seen in Cicero *Laelius* 82: *Neque solum colent amici inter se ac diligenter sed etiam verebuntur. Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit qui ex ea tollit verecundiam.* In this latter sentence, as Professor Preble (p. 134; cf. Mr. Greene, p. 10) points out, *verecundiam* is a mere repetition of *verebuntur* in the preceding sentence and it is therefore incapable of carrying strong emphasis. The new and consequently important idea is expressed by *maximum ornamentum*.

The main difficulty, I think, is that each writer neglects factors in the problem which are more fundamental than emphasis.

One of these is a principle¹ which is treated by Herbert Spencer in his essay on *The Philosophy of Style* as the very foundation of the art of composition. It is this: one should express the elements of his thought in the way (and in the order) in which the hearer can most readily use them for reconstructing the thought²; "economy of the recipient's attention" is essential to effective writing or speaking. Now, it is evidently to the hearer's advantage to know what topic is to be discussed before he is asked to assimilate the speaker's contribution. A fragmentary inscription or papyrus may seem quite hopeless, and yet when once we have found a clue to its subject matter we may be able to restore it almost entire. Every schoolboy knows how much more difficult a Latin sentence becomes when taken out of its context.

It is not necessary, however, that the grammatical subject should stand first, but merely that the given term, that part of the thought which is already familiar, should form the starting point. This is known technically as the psychological subject. To quote from Strong, Logeman, and Wheeler³, "The psychological subject expresses the conception which

the speaker wishes to bring into the mind of the hearer; the psychological predicate indicates that which he wishes him to think about it". The psychological subject may or may not be identical with the grammatical subject. If on entering the breakfast room I announce, 'Today is my birthday', *today* is the psychological as well as the grammatical subject. But if someone asks when my birthday comes, his question defines the starting point as *my birthday*; and when I reply, 'Today is my birthday', *today* is the psychological predicate. Again, if in answer to the question 'Whose birthday is today?' I reply, 'Today is my birthday', the psychological subject is *today is (someone's) birthday* or *today is (a) birthday*, and *my* is the psychological predicate. In fact, a verb, an adverb, or an adjective, as well as a substantive, a phrase, or a clause, may be used as psychological subject and the psychological predicate may be a phrase, a clause, or any part of speech with the single exception of the relative pronoun.

In connected discourse, in which as a rule each sentence takes up the thought where the last one left it, the psychological subject is usually identical with some idea either expressed or implied in the context. Of course the speaker may 'change the subject' at any time, but as long as there is no break in the continuity of the thought, the psychological subject is to be sought in that member of the sentence which is a repetition of something previously mentioned.

Probably all languages⁴ have a tendency to put the psychological subject at the head of the sentence. The speaker lets the hearer know what he is talking about before trying to modify the hearer's thought about that topic. At present we are concerned with the application of the principle to Latin.

What I should like to call the normal order of the Latin sentence is well illustrated in Pliny *Epp.* 2. 12. 1, 2⁵ *Αιολόγῳ illud quod superesse Mari Prisci causae proxime scripseram, nescio an satis, circumciscum tamen et adrasum est*⁶. *Firminus* inductus in senatum respondit crimini noto. *Secutae sunt* ('the next event on the program was') *diversae sententiae consulum designatorum: Cornutus Tertullus* censuit *ordine movendum, Acutius Nerva* in sortitione provinciae rationem eius non habendam. *Quae sententia* tamquam mitior vicit, cum sit alioqui durior tristiorque.

The following examples illustrate the frequent clashing of psychological and grammatical subject. The psychological subjects to which I wish to call attention are printed in italics. Pliny begins a letter (1. 12) by saying, *Iacturam gravissimam feci, si iactura dicenda est tanti viri amisso. Decessit* ('the

¹ Cf. Meader, *The School Review* 17. 243.

² The rules of word-order which Spencer deduces from the principle seem to the writer to be incorrect, and in fact Spencer himself is driven to restrict their applicability to the communication of comparatively simple thoughts to hearers or readers who have trained minds!

³ *The History of Language*, 95. See also the following pages. The terms originated with von der Gabelentz, Lazarus und Steinthal's *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* 6. 378 ff. Illuminating discussions of the subject may be found in the same author's *Sprachwissenschaft*⁴, 365-376, and in Weyener, *Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens*, 10 ff. Von der Gabelentz pointed out the bearing of his discovery upon Latin word-order, but classical scholars have been slow to take advantage of it.

⁴ See Gabelentz *Die Sprachwissenschaft*⁵, 372 ff.

⁵ The italics give the psychological subjects.

⁶ He had been mentioned in this connection in the preceding letter.

deceased is') Corellius Rufus. After discussing the speakers on one side of a question before the senate, Pliny continues (9. 13. 15), *Dicunt contra Avidius Quietus, Cornutus Tertullus*. Cicero outlines the plans of the conspirators and then says (Cat. 1. 10), *Haec ego omnia vixdum etiam coetu vestro dimisso comperi*.

It will be seen that in the sentences so far discussed the psychological predicate carries the stronger emphasis. That is because by definition it embodies the novel part of the sentence, the part for whose sake the whole sentence is spoken or written. That is, the logical arrangement of psychological subject and predicate is also, as a rule, climactic. I suspect that this is the secret of more than one passage where Professor Greene holds that a word stands at the sentence-close to make it emphatic. He calls our attention, for example, to § 76 of the Cato Maior, where Cicero shows that the occupations of childhood, of youth, and of the prime of life are successively laid aside: *Ergo, ut superiorum aetatum studia occidunt, sic occidunt etiam senectutis*, 'The law by which we outgrow the interests of earlier life applies also to those of old age'. The *sic*-clause is placed second because it is the psychological predicate and *senectutis* stands last of all because it is the psychological predicate of its clause.

In case the psychological subject is not inferred from the context or the situation but is arbitrarily introduced by the speaker or writer, it is frequently almost or quite as emphatic as the predicate. Livy begins his third decade with the words *In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari quod in principio summae totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores*, . . . Early in the first book of the Histories (Chapters 9-11) Tacitus describes the state of feeling in the provincial armies. He begins the several accounts as follows: *Superior exercitus legatum Hordeonium Flaccum spernebat*, . . . *Inferioris Germaniae legiones diutius sine consulari fuere*, . . . *In Britannico exercitu nihil irarum*, . . . *Quies et in Illyrico*, . . . *Oriens adhuc innotus*. *Syriam et quattuor legiones obtinebat Licinius Mucianus*, . . . *Bellum Iudaicum Flavius Vespasianus* . . . *administrabat*. *Aegyptum copiasque* . . . *Africa ac legiones in ea*, . . . *Duae Mauritaniae, Raetia, Noricum, Thracia, et quae aliae procuratoribus cohibentur*, . . . Each division of the topic, except the fourth, is introduced by an emphatic psychological subject. This fourth takes a subject, *quies*, from the context, and the stronger emphasis falls upon the psychological predicate *et in Illyrico*.

It should be noted, however, that even in such passages as these the psychological predicate is not deprived of emphasis. In the sentence *Oriens adhuc innotus*, for example, the present writer is unable to decide whether *Oriens* or *innotus* carries the stronger emphasis. Surely there is not so much dif-

ference between them that we can safely make it explain the word-order.

Another important factor in determining Latin word-order is suggested by Professor Meader in an article in *The School Review* 17. 230-243 (especially 231) in these words:

The general thought which the sentence is to symbolize is more or less clearly felt *before* the actual formation (or utterance) of the sentence begins; that is to say, we have a more or less distinct idea of what we are about to say even before we begin to speak. The sentence proper is the act of organizing this indefinite mass of thought and feeling. The act of organizing consists both in the analysis of the mass into its elements, and in consciously setting these elements into their relations to each other. . . . As each one of these elements in succession is lifted out of the general mass of unanalyzed thought, it is brought clearly before the mind and is seen in its relations to the other elements already thus treated.

The order of words in (ordinary conversation) will normally correspond to the order in which the successive elements are apperceived, and the reasons for the order are accordingly to be sought in the conditions that determine the order in which the various elements are brought into the 'focal point' of consciousness.

Now that element of the whole idea in which the speaker is most interested, the part upon which he wants to lay the strongest emphasis, will normally be the first one to be "brought into the focal point of consciousness". We have at once a reason why there should be a tendency to put the most emphatic word first.

But, since the most emphatic word is usually part of the psychological predicate, there arises a conflict between two opposing tendencies, of which now one now the other prevails. The order, psychological predicate + psychological subject, the emphatic order, is common whenever the speaker's emotions get the better of his judgment. In moments of great excitement we so far neglect the hearer's interest as to omit the psychological subject altogether. 'Fool!' or 'Thief!' says one who is angry, and trusts that the hearer will supply the second personal pronoun rather than the first. 'Fire! fire!' we shout, and leave the hearer to search the sky-line for our psychological subject. 'What a thrilling experience!' says a school girl, on coming in from a drive, and only by means of questions do we learn what caused the thrills.

Perhaps it is the emotional character of this arrangement, rather than a calculating desire to secure emphasis, that leads to its employment in literature. At any rate it is a noteworthy fact that the arrangement is particularly frequent in poetry¹ and emotional prose. It accounts for the habit, prevalent in many if not all languages, of putting the imperative² and the interrogative pronoun early in the sentence. The state of mind that leads to the employment of the

¹ Spencer, l. c. takes most of his examples of this order from poetry.

² Cf. Mr. Greene, pp. 10, 12.

arrangement is easily seen in Pliny Epp. 1. 12. 4. (Corellius Rufus) *pedum dolore correptus est. Patrius hic illi*. He hastens to tell us that his friend's gout was no disgrace.

Another clear case of an emotional inversion is seen in Cicero Mur. 13 *Saltatorem appellat L. Murenam Cato*. Professor Preble (p. 133) is surely right in thinking that *saltatorem* is the most emphatic word. That does not amount to saying, as Professor Greene (p. 12) ironically suggests, that Cicero intended to insult Cato by mentioning him at the end of the sentence. *Cato* stands last simply because the emphatic predicate *saltatorem* has usurped the first place and has naturally been followed by the words that logically belong next to it¹.

The emotional order, however, requires careful handling in order to avoid the bathos of an anticlimax. After the murder of Servius Tullius his daughter drove to the senate house and hailed her husband as king. When she had reached a certain point on the homeward journey, according to Livy 1. 48. 6, *restitit pavidus atque inhibuit frenos* is *qui iumenta agebat*—. If the sentence ended here we might well suspect its genuineness, but Livy has added a second and more important predicate—*iacentemque dominae Servium trucidatum ostendit*. The arrangement is not logical, but Livy has been careful not to let our interest flag at the sentence-close. When the senate had passed a measure of which Pliny disapproved, he wrote (Epp. 2. 12. 5) *Numerantur enim sententiae, non ponderantur*. Says Cicero (Cat. 2. 2) 'Because he has left the citizens safe and the city standing, in what despair do you suppose he has been cast to the ground?' *Iacet ille nunc prostratus*. *Iacet ille nunc* substitutes a statement for the preceding rhetorical question and serves as the psychological subject of the new sentence. The psychological predicate follows in *prostratus*. The psychological subject, however, consists of a subject and predicate, and these are inverted: the emotionally prominent *iacet* has usurped the first place. But to cite the first two words without context as an inversion for the sake of emphasis would be misleading, for it is only the following *prostratus* that saves the sentence from being anticlimactic.

Sometimes the same end is attained by putting the psychological subject between two parts of the predicate, as *impetum* in the following (Livy 25. 11. 5): *Tum signo dato coorti undique Poeni sunt. . . . Nec sustinuerunt impetum Romani, . . .*

Of course these two principles are not the only ones that affect Latin word-order. Professor Meader (l. c. 235) has called attention to the tendency to bring together in the sentence those elements which are most closely associated with one another. Numerous other considerations, such as the fixed order of certain phrases, the effort to secure a suitable

rhythm, a fondness for or a dislike of the balanced structure, have to be taken into account. Our contention is merely this: in the interest of clearness the Latin sentence regularly places the psychological subject before the psychological predicate. In emotional passages, however, the psychological predicate or a part of it often stands first.

The two opposing tendencies are both present in English as well as in Latin, and in about the same relative strength. It is for this reason chiefly that we are bound to keep pretty close to the order of the original in translating from Latin into English or vice versa—not for any vague, or 'subtle', considerations of emphasis. Isn't it time to stop bewildering our students by all this talk about minute distinctions in emphasis which none of us can represent in our pronunciation of either Latin or English?

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REVIEWS

Latin Forms and Syntax. By Robert H. Locke.

Philadelphia: John J. McVey (1908).

The motto of this book, *Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulos*, is well chosen. A few quotations will show how this idea underlies the making of the book.

There were (originally) three sources of languages, the agglutinative, the analytic, and the synthetic. . . . Latin is synthetic: (it) added syllables to the original word or stem. . . . Originally every noun had the same case-ending to express the same idea. There was only one declension, and not five; but the influence of the vowels altered the form of the case-endings. It then became necessary to have a declension for each vowel. . . . The ablative singular of every noun originally ended in *-ed*, . . . thus producing those guttural sounds characteristic of all primitive people. As intelligence developed, the sound was thrown forward, or strengthened, by the dropping of the *-ed*, and the lengthening of the preceding vowel in compensation. . . . In early ages people imagined all natural objects as living beings, and made them masculine or feminine according to their notion of their properties. This primitive denotation of gender survived, even after the Romans ceased to so regard natural objects. . . . The origin of *i*-stems is obscure. They are extremely rare in early Latin, and were probably being developed in the classical period. They were in a transition stage. Accordingly they have, as a rule, both consonant and *i*-stem endings. . . . The first necessity of speech was to find names for material objects. . . . The next step was to express motion. Now there can be only two directions of motion: motion toward and motion from. Any third idea must be that of rest. These fundamental ideas . . . were expressed by the accusative, ablative and dative cases, respectively. They lie at the bottom of every subsequent use of the cases. . . . An action may pass to one object (the accusative) and proceed to another (the dative), where it rests. A bullet may hit one object, be deflected, and lodge in another. . . . The imperfect indicative (of *sum*) is used to form the pluperfect indicative (active) of other verbs; the imperfect subjunctive to form the pluperfect subjunctive (active).

¹ Cf. Meader l. c., 235.

The five declensions, and similarly the four conjugations, are given all together. They are first developed by 'synthesis', and afterward the paradigms are given. The method is possible in nouns and regular verbs, but it is not even attempted in pronouns and irregular verbs¹. As a matter of fact, all the material for memorizing is, and necessarily must be, given in just about the same paradigmatic form in which it usually appears in beginners' books. The synthesizing is supplementary. *Too much* attention upon the principia rerum inevitably enervates the grasp of the essential facts, all-important for life as it is. Sit omnibus rebus moderatio. It is, moreover, to the reviewer, incredible that any class can study the five declensions as one and eventually be able to distinguish the forms. What we need for beginners is not a clearer or more accurate explanation of how things happen to be as they are, but a better pedagogical method for attaining the memorizing of those forms and facts which must be known before transfer of thought by written or printed language is possible. The methods of the centuries past have been found deficient in that they neglected the factor of attention: attention was enforced by external means; now it must be captivated by an internal charm. The error of this book is that it neglects the factor of convention: in any human affair many things are so just because they are so, because a certain people got started into a certain habit and then followed the line of least resistance. In some measure the history of forms and syntax may help to fix attention: but in general neither the moving causes nor the antecedent facts, but only the habits of the classical period, concern beginners. Otherwise we should teach Anglo-Saxon before English grammar.

Too much theorizing leads to juggling with facts: cf. e. g. p. 13, "in the pronunciation of *princip*, the lips would remain closed forever unless 'e' were sounded". Again, on p. 148, indicative and subjunctive future conditions are distinguished as being, respectively, "admitted (in accordance with the facts)" and "imaginary"; on p. 156 the statement implies that *cum*-causal takes the indicative if on one's own authority; on p. 143 result is said to be expressed by the subjunctive because "the result depends upon the main verb"; on p. 156 the same explanation is applied to *cum*-clauses (where the usage of classical times was almost pure convention). On p. 159 we read "Nearly all subordinate clauses are expressed by the subjunctive"—could any more fatal idea be gotten into a boy's head? (see also above.) There are

¹ So it is comparatively easy to trace the pedigree of each use of the accusative case from the supposed original meaning, it is more difficult in the dative (starting from the 'rest' idea), and fails utterly in the genitive and ablative. In the book before us the entire syntax of subordinate clauses is developed from the statement that the subjunctive "expresses something, at the time referred to, following the main verb, . . . something not at the time a fact". The connection is for the most part highly artificial, sometimes wholly lacking, and sometimes false (e.g. the association of *quoniam*-clauses with verbs of fearing). *Cum*-clauses and all indicative clauses are relegated to parenthetical notes.

some apparently careless misstatements. So on p. 129 the ablative of degree of difference is made to = 'than'; on p. 129 *plenus frumento* is given as the regular construction; on p. 121 the genitive depending on *causa* is said to be objective; on p. 133 indirect discourse is said to be used "after all verbs or expressions followed by the introductory word 'that' in English"; on p. 161 by implication it is stated that *utinam* is not regularly used with the imperfect optative subjunctive.

The parts of speech are treated in the order of the grammars, and syntax follows. Extensive knowledge of English grammar is presumed. The exercises consist of twenty-five to one hundred phrases or sentences in each lesson (there are only fifty lessons). There is no English-Latin until syntax is begun. The sentences are nearly all taken, almost unchanged, from the first book of Caesar. When forms occur which the student can not understand, the translation is given in parentheses. The general vocabulary must be used from the beginning. The lesson vocabularies contain only 245 words; but the vocabulary of the exercises consists of 966 words, of which 722 occur five or more times in Caesar I-V; 110 occur less than five times in high-school Latin¹. There are misprints: *fugierunt* (p. 138), *propinquus* (180), *socer-eri* (183), and mistakes in numbering: par. 79 and 158, IV. There is unnecessary repetition (pp. 9 and 11, 89 and 94, 111 and 112) and some inconsistent statements (§§ 7, 40). Some words are printed twice in the vocabulary. *Itemque* is misplaced. The hyphen is inconsistently omitted in compounds of *sub* and *trans*. The quantity of vowels is not marked except here and there in the exercises, in the vocabulary, and in some paradigms.

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Helladian Vistas. By Don Daniel Quinn. Published by the author, at Yellow Springs, Ohio (1909).

The alert teacher of Greek will welcome any means by which he can broaden his horizon and come into more intimate touch with the life and thought of the Greek people, both in classic and in more recent times. No American, probably, is so well fitted as Dr. Quinn to give us an intimate view of Greek lands and the Greek people of today, and to make the proper connection between classic and modern conditions. He has, by long residence and extensive travel in Greek lands, made himself thoroughly familiar with the modern Greeks, especially the common people, and this intimate familiarity has made itself apparent on every page of this entertaining book. Myth and history, topography and archaeology, crowd each other on these pages, all helping to bring out clearly the present conditions and their relations to the greater past.

¹ Almost every one of these, however, occurs at least once in B. G. I.

The most interesting and instructive parts of the book treat mainly of Greek lands outside the beaten track of 'personally conducted' parties. The chapters on the various Ionian Islands and on the Maniats of southern Laconia are cases in point.

Father Quinn shows great interest, insight and fairness in his treatment of religious questions. The 'survivals' of ancient myth and ritual are continually indicated.

The brief but vivid account of the siege of Mesolonghi in the Greek Revolution is far superior in interest to the annalistic narrative of Howe, or to the scholarly but prosaic account of Finlay. It rather recalls the story of the novelist Xenos in his 'Andronike', translated by Grosvenor.

The most serious criticism to be passed upon Dr. Quinn's book grows out of his familiarity with the modern Greek pronunciation and his fondness for that pronunciation. This is a matter of the personal equation, of course, and it is within an author's technical right to use what are, to the readers to whom the book appeals, outlandish and repellent expressions, but *cui bono*?

In the first place, such a scheme is almost impossible of consistent execution, as Dr. Quinn's book abundantly proves. *Eu* in Greek names he regularly writes *ev*, thus giving us *Zeus*, *Elevisis*, *Peiraecevs*, and even *Akrokeravnian*, the last being an Anglicized form of a Latinized Greek word. Will Dr. Quinn tell us that this spelling represents any actual pronunciation of the English word at any period? Possibly *Elevisis* represents a some-time truth, but why not go to the length and use *Levsina* as the Greeks of today do? If we insist upon *Peiraecevs*, why not transliterate exactly and write *Peiraecevs*? Dr. Quinn writes *Bathy* and *Bolos*, but *Omer Vrioni*; why not *V* in all if we are to indicate the modern sounds? *Phaeaks* (not *Phaiaks*) for our old friends the Phaeacians, *Evmolpids*, *Levktra*, all raise our ire, for they simply introduce a new element of confusion into the already sufficiently perplexing question of spelling and pronunciation. Many of these words are thoroughly Anglicized, and no one, it seems to us, is justified in thus making a bad matter worse. And if bad for the Greek student who can "see the point", how much worse for the non-Greek reader who needs a glossary of Quinnisms to get him back into his former world.

But this is Father Quinn's little fad, and we gladly forgive him for it, in view of the instruction and pleasure he has given us in Helladian Vistas.

GEORGE A. WILLIAMS.

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CORRESPONDENCE

In sending you a brief rejoinder to Professor Greene's reply to my criticism of his paper upon Latin Word-Order, I would not occupy the position

of the proverbial woman who must have the last word, but I want to express regret for my slip in not noticing that *fiebat* and not *factus est* stands in the passage from Cicero's Milo, though, as Professor Greene suggests, the blunder does not invalidate my argument.

Will you spare me space for another remark or two? What Professor Greene says about the position of "the stronger or more significant word" seems to show that we mean different things by the term 'emphasis'. According to him these more significant words are *eo ipso* the more emphatic ones, while I hold that emphasis is quite independent of the connotative force of a word.

Again, Professor Greene says truly that 'we must note carefully the Latin form of expression'. It is on this account that it seems to me futile to try to settle any question of emphasis in Latin by setting before elocutionists unfamiliar with that language a literal translation of a Latin sentence. This might work if one could reproduce in English all the shadings of the thought in Latin sentences as well as one generally can those of the thought expressed in German or French or other modern languages, by translating nouns by nouns, verbs by verbs, adjectives by adjectives, etc. To deny emphasis to a Latin word because one would not emphasize its syntactical equivalent in an English sentence translated word for word from the Latin appears to me entirely unwarrantable.

I should like to show how such crude indications of emphasis as 'I am passing my FOUR and eightieth year', and 'But I come to the farmers, etc.', do not at all express the very slight degrees of emphasis which a Greenoughite sees in such sentences, but it would take too long, and your readers are doubtless weary of the subject already. I hope they will all read Professor Meader's article in The School Review for April.

NOTE

HORACE'S ESTIMATE OF HELIODORUS IN SERM. 1. 5. 3.

rhetor comes Heliodorus
Graecorum longe doctissimus.

The individual alluded to probably cannot now be identified. "The hyperbole is intended and is playful", comments Wickham. "Probably a friendly overestimate, as no account of him has come down to us with all his learning", observes Greenough. "An exaggerated expression characteristic of the mock-heroic style which Horace adopts in several parts of this satire, . . . a form of wit common in modern times", writes Rolfe. Among the multitude of similar comments on this passage, we may be surprised that what seems an obvious explanation is not emphasized, that Horace is speaking in bitter

irony, as one who, while suffering from dyspepsia, has probably been bored to extinction by a garrulous pedant. The Greek erudition of Heliodorus was a sorry *passé-temps* for the youthful poet, who doubtless wished himself out of such company and back in Rome. The estimate is no more serious than the following from a later period. Fronto (Ep. ad Amicos 1. 7; see Naber p. 140), in recommending on hearsay testimony as a teacher Antoninus Aquila, vir doctus et facundus, closes his letter with the quip: ego vero etiam nomine hominis faveo ut sit ῥητόρων ἀριστος, quoniam quidem Aquila appellatur.

There is no reason to suppose that Heliodorus was a member of the 'junket' to Brundisium. That *longe doctissimus* is playfully characterizing is a possible assumption, yet it would seem that Horace could hardly have been in a very playful mood. Scheiden thut Weh! Departure from Rome came hard. The main party was to be met further on. The big capital with its lavish hospitality would be missed in the humble road-house in the little village of Aricia. Horace doubtless knew the oft-quoted sententia of Publius Syrus, that *comes facundus in via pro vehiculo*, and cursed the amiable volubility of the pedant on the Via Appia as heartily as he did the officiousness of the light o' tongue on the Via Sacra (Serm. 1. 9). At Forum Appi he had to rub shoulders with the brutal bargemen and fleecing inn keepers. The travelers were disinclined to hasten, the road was rough. The water was bad; Horace was sick. There does not seem much likelihood that Horace at this stage was in a cheerful mood; it seems less likely that looking back on his journey, as he writes this satire, he would inject a bit of pleasantry; irony rather would suit his mood.

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THE CESNOLA COLLECTION

We give, in slightly condensed form, the article on this subject by John M. Myres, in the September number of the Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

The further progress which has now been made with the examination and rearrangement of the Cesnola Collection of Cypriote Antiquities permits a general forecast of the results.

First, as to selection and arrangement of exhibits. The very large size of the collection has always made it impossible to expose all the objects for general study. It has therefore been decided to separate the collection into two parts, one of which, consisting of the finest specimens of each kind of workmanship, will be treated as a series of typical examples, and retained on view in the present gallery on the ground floor of the Museum; while the other, which will contain the many large series of objects of almost monotonous similarity, will be transferred to a less public gallery, easily accessible from the

former, and more convenient for the special purposes of expert students.

The series of typical vases which has been selected for exhibition consists of about 2,000 examples. It will occupy the whole of the seventy-eight wall cases of the west and south walls of the gallery, together with eight large floor cases. In the latter are collected a small number of the largest and most important vases of each successive style; and by this means it is possible to do justice to the fine groups of Mycenaean and Orientalizing vases, in which the collection is so rich.

A similar range of cases on the east wall of the gallery and on the walls of the northern annex, is assigned to the Type series of Cypriote sculpture, which is supplemented in the same way as the vases, by floor cases containing the larger heads and busts, and a selection of the largest terra-cotta heads. The life-size statues which formerly filled the middle of the Cypriote Gallery, will in future be redistributed in three groups, round the central piers, and considerably reduced in number, corresponding provision being made in the Students' Collection downstairs for the statues withdrawn from above. The great sarcophagi and sculptured tombs and tombstones will in future be grouped together in the northern annex of the same gallery, under more favorable conditions of light and space than has been possible hitherto.

All the sculpture and most of the painted vases have been found on examination to need thorough and careful cleaning. It was already known that many objects had required and received minor repairs before they could be put on exhibition at all; and care has been taken to determine exactly in the process of cleaning the precise extent of these repairs. In general, however, it may be repeated already, that the appearance of the statues is very little affected by the process. The chief changes in their aspect are due to the recovery of the mellow cream-colored tones of the soft native limestone of which the statues are made; and to the discovery, in many instances, of clear and even copious traces of their original coloring. One of the most notable pieces in the collection, for example, the well-known 'Priest with the Dove', is found to have many marks of red borders and designs on the drapery, besides decoration in red, black, and yellow on the helmet, and traces of red color on the lips. Some of the Orientalizing statues were also brightly colored originally, and the same practice persisted in the Cypriote art of the fifth and fourth centuries, and perhaps even later still.

The preparation of a general guide to the whole collection has been greatly facilitated by the detailed studies of which a summary has been given above; and it is hoped that it may be possible to make this guide public not long after the reopening of the collection itself to the public.

JOHN L. MYRES.

